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Due Process in Public University Discipline
Cases
*Marie T. Reilly
I. INTRODUCTION
The stakes are high for university students accused of misconduct.
When expulsion is a possible sanction, an accused student faces a financial
loss and a stigma that may preclude admission to another university or
access to a career that requires a clean conduct record.1 For universities,
the stakes are also high. Universities use student disciplinary processes to
maintain a safe environment for learning and to convey and promote
university and civic values.2 Discipline procedures are matters of public
interest and criticism, particularly where the alleged misconduct is sexual.3
When student discipline processes are fair and perceived as such, these
processes reinforce a culture of responsible and ethical behavior that will
benefit students, faculty, and staff into the future. When discipline
processes are perceived as unfair, irrelevant, or overly bureaucratic, the
negative impact on the university is similarly profound and long-lasting.

* Marie T. Reilly, Professor of Law, The Pennsylvania State University, University
Park
1. E.g., Furey v. Temple Univ., 884 F. Supp. 2d 223, 247–48 (E.D. Pa. 2012); Doe
v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., No. 1:15-cv-209, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24847, at *17–18 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2016). See also Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294
F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961) (“Without sufficient education the plaintiffs would not be
able to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as
possible the duties and responsibilities of good citizens.”).
2. E.g., Furey, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 248 (noting that Temple University has an interest
in maintaining safety and in using its resources “to best achieve its educational mission and
the educational component of its disciplinary process”). See also Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[Ed]ucation is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. . ..[and] the very foundation of good citizenship.”).
3. As of March 2015, the U.S. Dep’t. of Educ. Office of Civil Rights had open
investigations into 104 universities regarding their protocol for responding to a student
complaint of sexual assault by another student, nearly twice the number of open
investigations in 2014. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Educ.
Releases List of Higher Education Institutions with Open Title IX sexual Violence
Investigations (May 1, 2014), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-departmenteducation-releases-list-higher-education-institutions-open-title-ix-sexual-violenceinvestigations.
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As state actors, public universities’ student discipline processes
implicate a student’s liberty and property interest in an education.4 Public
universities must provide each accused student with due process of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment.5 Students subject to discipline by
private universities are not entitled to constitutional protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment because private universities are not state actors.6
However, both private and public university discipline cases are subject to
judicial review under state law as a breach of contract between the student
and the university or under the law of associations.7 Both private and
public universities must follow their internal rules of procedure, but
whether departures are a breach of contract is an issue of state law and not
necessarily a deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.8
4. See, e.g., Woodis v. Westark Cmty. Coll., 160 F.3d 435, 440 (8th Cir. 1998)
(stating nursing student at a community college was entitled to due process); Gorman v.
Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating “a student’s interest in pursuing an
education is included within the fourteenth amendment’s protection of liberty and
property”); Hart v. Ferris State Coll., 557 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (noting
that “threat of . . . expulsion implicates [a college student’s] property and liberty interests
in . . . education and reputation”). But see, McGee v. Schoolcraft Cmty. Coll., 167 F.
App’x 429, 437 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that whether a college student’s interest in
continued enrollment is protected by procedural due process “has not been resolved.”). See
also, Lee v. Univ. of Mich.- Dearborn, No. 5:06-CV-66, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72236, at
*24–25 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2007) (extending qualified immunity to former university
provost on grounds that the existence and scope of a college student’s due process rights
“appear to be an issue of judicial debate.”).
5. The Supreme Court has assumed without deciding that public university students
have property and liberty interests in their education. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v.
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 223 (1985). See also Tigrett v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
290 F.3d 620, 627 (4th Cir. 2002). Lower courts have recognized public university
students’ property and liberty interests in continued enrollment. See. e.g., Woodis, 160
F.3d at 440; Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that public
university students have an implied contract which requires university to act in good faith,
and which provides a property interest entitled to due process protection); Gorman, 837
F.2d at 12 (finding that public post-secondary students have a constitutionally-protected
liberty and property interest in their education); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th
Cir. 1975) (finding that public university student has a property interest in education). But
see Galdikas v. Fagan, 342 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that whether a college
student has a property right for purposes of substantive due process protection in continued
enrollment is an open question in the circuit).
6. E.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982) (finding that a private
university is not a state actor).
7. See, e.g., Yu v. Vassar Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448, 452 (S.D. N.Y. 2015); Bleiler
v. Coll. of the Holy Cross, No. 11-11541-DJC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127775, at *1 (D.
Mass. Aug. 26, 2013). See generally An Overview: The Private University and Due
Process, 1970 DUKE L.J. 795 (1970); Note, Common Law Rights for Private University
Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, 84 YALE L.J. 120 (1974).
8. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 541 (1985); Heyne v.
Metro. Nashville Pub. Schs., 655 F.3d 556, 569 (6th Cir. 2011); Levitt v. Univ. of Tex.,
759 F.2d 1224, 1230 (5th Cir. 1985); Doe v. Hazard, No. 5:15-CV-300-JMH, 2016 U.S.
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In Goss v. Lopez,9 the Supreme Court held that a public high school
student subject to a ten-day suspension had a property and liberty interest
in education protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and was entitled to
notice and an opportunity to be heard before imposition of the sanction.10
A school must provide “effective notice and [an] informal hearing” as a
“meaningful hedge against erroneous action.”11 A year later, in Mathews
v. Eldridge,12 the Court explained that whether state administrative
procedures provide sufficient due process requires a balance among three
factors: 1) the nature of the private interest that the state action will affect;
2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of private interests through the
procedure at issue, and value of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards in reducing that risk; and 3) the cost that additional or substitute
procedural safeguards would impose on the state actor.13
In 1961, fourteen years before the Supreme Court decided Goss, the
Fifth Circuit set out its due process standards for public university student
discipline cases. In Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,14 the
University of Alabama had expelled several students for protesting racial
segregation without notice of the charges or an opportunity to be heard.15
The Fifth Circuit held that a student facing expulsion is entitled to notice
of the charges against him and a description of the evidence that if proven
would justify the sanction.16 Additionally, the student is entitled to a
hearing at which he can present a defense and a report of the findings
against him.17 Although courts uniformly follow the mandate in Goss that
due process in student discipline cases requires at a minimum notice of the
charges and an opportunity to be heard, several circuit courts have adopted
the standard set forth in Dixon as guidance for determining what process
a university must provide.18
Dist. LEXIS 5478, at *16 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 15, 2016); Sterrett v. Cowan, 85 F. Supp. 3d 916,
926 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
9. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
10. Id. at 572–75, 577.
11. Id. at 583.
12. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
13. Id. at 335. See e.g., Furey v. Temple Univ., 884 F. Supp. 2d 223, 247 (E.D. Pa.
2012) (applying Mathews v. Eldridge factors in a university student discipline case);
Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1989) (same).
14. Dixon v. Ala. State. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961).
15. Id. at 151–52.
16. Id. at 158.
17. Id. at 159.
18. See Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Dixon with
approval as a “valuable discussion of the procedural due process rights of students”);
Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that the
summary of requirements in Dixon remains valid); Jones v. Snead, 431 F.2d 1115, 1117
(8th Cir. 1970) (stating that notice and opportunity to be heard are essential factors); Doe
v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., No. 1:15-cv-209, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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When the alleged student misconduct is sexual, a public university
must simultaneously ensure that it handles the case in compliance with the
mandate of Title IX that no student “shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.”19
Title IX regulations specifically require
universities to adopt “grievance procedures providing for prompt and
equitable resolution of student and employee complaints alleging any
[action prohibited by title IX].”20
In April 2011, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) issued a “Dear Colleague” letter (the 2011 Letter) to
colleges and universities under its jurisdiction which set out specific
procedures that universities must follow in investigating and resolving
claims of student-on-student sexual misconduct.21 The OCR has
explained that the procedures for charges of sexual misconduct set forth in
the 2011 Letter do not have the force of law. Rather, they “simply serve[]
to advise the public of the construction of the regulation [the OCR]
administers and enforces.”22
In June 2016, a University of Virginia student filed a complaint
challenging the OCR’s legal authority to enforce the procedural
requirements set out in the 2011 Letter, and Oklahoma Wesleyan
University was the first university to join the suit in August 2016.23
Universities under OCR investigation have settled OCR enforcement
actions by accepting wide ranging OCR oversight and supervision, likely
reflecting university deference to the OCR’s power to investigate
universities it suspects of non-compliance with Title IX and to terminate a
non-compliant institution’s access to federal financial aid programs.24 The
24847, at *45 (E.D. Va. Feb. 26, 2016) (listing the due process requirements); Jacksa v.
Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1249 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (stating that “due
process requires a state university to give its students notice and the opportunity to be
heard”); Edwards v. Bd. of Regents, 397 F. Supp. 822, 827 (W. D. Mo. 1975) (outlining
the due process requirements).
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
20. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (2016); accord 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012).
21. Letter from Russlyn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to
Dear Colleague, at 6–18 (Apr. 4, 2011), www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/
colleague-201104.pdf [hereinafter 2011 Dear Colleague Letter].
22. Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, to Hon. James
Lankford, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., at 3 (Feb. 17, 2016), http://chronicle.com/items/
biz/pdf/DEPT.%20of%20EDUCATION%20RESPONSE%20TO%20LANKFORD%20L
ETTER%202-17-16.pdf.
23. Amended Complaint, Doe v. Lhamon, No. 1:16-cv-01158-KBJ (D. D.C., August
15, 2016).
24. See, e.g., University of Virginia Resolution Agreement 19 (September 17, 2015),
http://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/university-virginia-agreement.pdf
(“Further, the University understands that during the monitoring of this Agreement, OCR
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OCR’s guidance to universities on how to provide “prompt and equitable”
grievance procedures for complaints alleging a Title IX violation focus
almost exclusively on universities’ obligations to the complainant.25 The
OCR has not offered guidance on what process is due to the accused
student, other than to caution that due process protections for the accused
student should “not restrict or unnecessarily delay vindication of a
complainant’s Title IX rights.”26
A university is subject to a student’s private right of action under Title
IX for failure to provide a response to a complaint of harassment.27 In a
suit against a university for damages, the plaintiff must show that the
university exercised substantial control over the perpetrator of the
discriminatory conduct, had actual knowledge and was deliberately
indifferent to the conduct, and that the university’s failure to respond
deprived him or her of educational benefits.28 The 2011 Letter states that
may visit the University, interview staff and students, and request additional reports or data
as are necessary for OCR to determine whether the University has fulfilled the terms of
this Agreement and is in compliance with the regulations implementing Title IX . . . .”);
Voluntary Resolution Agreement: Southern Methodist University 15 (Nov. 16, 2014),
http://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/southern-methodist-universityagreement.pdf (same); Resolution Agreement: Princeton University Case No. 02-11-2025,
at 13 (Oct. 12, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/princetonagreement.pdf (same).
25. 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 21, at 18.
26. Id. at 12 (“Public and state-supported schools must provide due process to the
alleged perpetrator. However, schools should ensure that steps taken to accord due process
rights to the alleged perpetrator do not restrict or unnecessarily delay the Title IX
protections for the complainant.”); accord U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS,
REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL
EMPLOYEES,
OTHER
STUDENTS,
OR
THIRD
PARTIES
22
(2001),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf.
(“The rights established
under Title IX must be interpreted consistent with any federally guaranteed due process
rights involved in a complaint proceeding. . . . [S]chools should ensure that steps to accord
due process rights do not restrict or unnecessarily delay the protections provided by Title
IX to the complainant.”).
27. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
633 (1999) (recognizing private cause of action under Title IX for student-on-student
sexual harassment); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992)
(recognizing full range of remedies for private action under Title IX); Cannon v. Univ. of
Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979) (recognizing a private right of action under Title IX).
28. Davis, 526 U.S. at 644–45; see S.K. v. N. Allegheny Sch. Dist., No. 2:14cv1156,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25975, at *17 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Davis). To establish that a
university was deliberately indifferent, the plaintiff must show that the school’s decision
not to provide a remedy for a Title IX violation was an official act and clearly unreasonable.
See Doe v. Willits Unified Sch. Dist., 473 F. App’x 775, 775–76 (9th Cir. 2012); Doe v.
Sch. Bd., 604 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2010); Bernard v. E. Stroudsburg Univ., No. 3:09CV-00525, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22573, at *32 (M.D. Pa. 2016). In Samuelson v. Or.
State Univ., No. 6:15-cv-01648-MC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20991, at *1 (D. Or. 2016),
the court found no university Title IX-based liability for a sexual assault of a female student
perpetrated by a non-student at an off campus private party. The court held that the
student’s claim that the university was deliberately indifferent to her report of the rape was
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“[i]f a school knows or reasonably should know about student-on-student
harassment that creates a hostile environment, Title IX requires the school
to take immediate action to eliminate the harassment, prevent its
recurrence, and address its effects.”29 In a footnote, the OCR explains that
this is the standard for its enforcement of Title IX and also applies to
private suits for injunctive relief. The OCR’s view is that the standard that
applies in private cases against universities for monetary damages is
“actual knowledge and deliberate indifference.”30
Because the stakes in university discipline cases for both students and
universities are so high, and the due process constitutionally required in
any particular situation is unclear, the prospect of a subsequent challenge
in court looms in nearly every case. This article considers how and why
courts have upheld or overturned public university student conduct
outcomes with focus on recent decisions. Given the unique facts of each
case and the variety of conduct codes and processes implemented by
universities, the cases confirm the Supreme Court’s observation in Goss,
that what process is due in a public school discipline case depends on the
circumstances.31 However, common themes appear which may provide
some practical guidance for universities and for courts.

barred by the statute of limitations. See id. at *25–26. But see Simpson v. Univ. of Colo.
Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1184–85 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that the Univ. of Colorado acted
intentionally in violation of Title IX by official policy showing a deliberate indifference to
an obvious need for training or guidance in connection with its program of providing
female student “ambassadors” to host football program recruits).
29. 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 21, at 4. The OCR takes the position that
a single act of student-on-student sexual violence can create a hostile environment. “The
more severe the conduct, the less need there is to show a repetitive series of incidents to
prove a hostile environment, particularly if the conduct is physical.” Dep’t of Educ., Office
for Civil Rights, Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, at 1 (Apr. 29,
2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [hereinafter
Questions and Answers]. The OCR defined “sexual violence” as “physical sexual acts
perpetrated against a person’s will or where a person is incapable of giving consent . . . .”
Id. at 1. Notwithstanding the requirement of a physical act in its definition of sexual
violence, OCR notes “sexual coercion” as an example of sexual violence, a term which
OCR does not define. Id.
30. Id. at 1(“A school violates a student’s rights under Title IX regarding student-onstudent sexual violence when the following conditions are met: (1) the alleged conduct is
sufficiently serious to limit or deny a student’s ability to participate in or benefit from the
school’s educational program, i.e. creates a hostile environment; and (2) the school, upon
notice, fails to take prompt and effective steps reasonably calculated to end the sexual
violence, eliminate the hostile environment, prevent its recurrence, and, as appropriate,
remedy its effects.”).
31. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (“[The] very nature of due process negates
any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.”
419 U.S. at 565, citing Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961)).
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II. WHAT PROCESS IS DUE?
A. Notice of the Charges
Meaningful notice is an essential element of due process. To provide
due process, the notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”32 The
Supreme Court in Goss held that a public high school student subject to
suspension is entitled to “oral or written notice of the charges against
him . . . .”33 It observed that the more serious the stakes are for the accused
student, the more formal and detailed the notice must be.34 In Dixon, the
court held that a university student accused of misconduct is entitled to “a
statement of the specific charges” against him. 35 The content and timing
of the notice necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process has been
the subject of challenges with a variety of outcomes.
In Nash v. Auburn University,36 the Eleventh Circuit held that the
university’s notice of charges against two veterinary students accused of
cheating on an exam was constitutionally sufficient although it did not
provide a detailed description of the facts underlying the charges or the
nature of the evidence to be offered.37 The court held that advance notice
of the expected testimony of witnesses was not required because the
students were present at the hearing and able to confront adverse
witnesses.38 In response to the plaintiff’s challenge to the timing of notice
of the charges, the court held that a four-day advance notice of a hearing
on charges of academic dishonesty was sufficient.39
In Flaim v. Medical College of Ohio,40 the college expelled a medical
student who pled guilty to a criminal charge of possession of a controlled
substance. The school notified the student of the specific conduct rules he

32. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
33. Goss, 419 U.S. at 581.
34. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 584 (“Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder
of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures.”).
35. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961).
36. Nash v. Auburn University, 812 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1987).
37. Id. at 663. The plaintiffs asserted that the notice did not summarize the testimony
expected from the professor who prepared and graded the exam. Id. at 662.
38. Id. at 662–63.
39. Id. at 661–62; see also Goss, 419 U.S. at 582–83 (finding that where student was
subject to a ten day suspension, the school need not provide for a delay between giving
notice of the charges and the hearing, however, notice and hearing should precede removal
of the student from school unless the student’s presence presents a “danger to persons or
property” or disrupts the academic process, in which case the “hearing should follow as
soon as practicable”).
40. Flaim v. Medical College of Ohio, 418 F. 3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005).
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was charged with violating and informed him of his procedural rights.41
Because there were no underlying facts in dispute—the student had
already been convicted of a drug felony—the court held that the notice
was sufficient because it provided a meaningful opportunity to prepare for
the hearing.42 Requiring more information in the notice “would be nothing
more than an additional and unnecessary expense and administrative
burden . . . without any corresponding benefit [to the student].”43
In Sterrett v. Cowan,44 a student accused of sexual misconduct
received notice of the charges against him but not until after an equal
opportunity specialist interviewed him.45 The specialist incorporated
findings based on the interview in a report in which she concluded that the
plaintiff was responsible for sexual misconduct that due to its severity
created a hostile environment, triggering the university’s obligations under
Title IX.46 The plaintiff learned during the initial interview the nature of
the charges against him. The university later provided him with the
specialist’s summary of the interview and an activity log of her interviews
with four unnamed witnesses.47 The court denied the university’s motion
to dismiss in part because it failed to provide the plaintiff with notice of
the charges before the interview with the equal opportunity specialist.48
In Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason University,49 the court
held that the notice the university provided to the student was deficient
because the university expelled the student for conduct other than the
conduct identified in the notice it provided.50 The notice specified charges
relating to a single incident of sexual misconduct on a particular day. The
hearing panel heard ten hours of evidence and found the student not

41. Id. at 632–33.
42. Id. at 639.
43. Id.
44. Sterrett v. Cowan, 85 F. Supp. 3d 916 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
45. Id. at 927. The student received notice of an “undefined” student complaint
against him. Id. He alleged that he was not provided with notice of the specific allegations
made against him during the interview, but “eventually gleaned that it involved unspecified
sexual misconduct allegations by [a classmate] and friend . . . .” Id.
46. Id. at 923.
47. Id. at 927.
48. Id. But see, Howe v. Pa. State Univ. Harrisburg, No. 1:16–0102, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11981, at *15–16 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2016) (finding that due process does not require
that the plaintiff receive notice of the charges before an informal disciplinary conference).
49. Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., No. 1:15-cv-209, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24847 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2016).
50. Id. at *28–32.
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responsible for that incident.51 The complainant appealed.52 The
administrator who heard the appeal conducted a de novo review, and
conducted ex parte and off the record conversations with the members of
the hearing panel, the complainant, and the plaintiff.53 The administrator
overruled the hearing panel and expelled the plaintiff for sexual assault
without providing the plaintiff with a factual basis for his decision or
procedural grounds for reversing the decision of the panel.54 The plaintiff
learned only as a result of discovery in his federal court case that the
administrator’s decision to expel him was based on alleged conduct other
than that specified in the notice to him and other than the conduct that the
hearing panel had considered.55
The court viewed the university’s failure to provide notice of the
charges on which the plaintiff was ultimately disciplined as denial of the
plaintiff’s opportunity to be heard.56 Applying the balance of factors in
Mathews v. Eldridge, the burden to the university of informing the plaintiff
that his entire relationship with the accusing student was at issue in the
disciplinary proceedings against him was “incredibly low,” while
prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability to mount an effective defense absent that
notice was significant.57 The court noted that due process does not require
a particular form of notice, specific means of communication of notice, or
even notice before the first level hearing.58 In this case, however, the
university provided the student no notice of the conduct for which he was
ultimately disciplined. “Failure to provide clear and specific notice that
might allow for a meaningful defense is constitutionally insufficient to
provide due process.”59

51. Id. at *9–13; see GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT 2015–
2016: SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT,
§ XVI, at 13–25 (updated Aug. 27, 2015), https://studentconduct.gmu.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2011/09/2015-2016-Code-of-Student-Conduct.pdf.
52. The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter states that if a school’s discipline process
provides for an appeal, it must provide the right to appeal to both the accused student and
the complainant. See Questions and Answers, supra note 29, at 26.
53. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24847, at *13–
14.
54. Id. at *15.
55. Id. at *16.
56. Id. at *28 (citing Flaim v. Med. College of Ohio, 418 F. 3d 629, 638 (6th Cir.
2005)). The Flaim Court noted that constitutionally adequate notice must afford “a
meaningful opportunity to prepare for the hearing.” Flaim, 418 F. 3d at 638.
57. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24847, at *30–
31.
58. Id. at *31.
59. Id. at *32. (Emphasis added).
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B. Discovery Rights and Meaningful Opportunity to Present a Defense
It is clear that due process does not require universities to provide
accused students with the full range of litigation-style discovery rights in
a disciplinary proceeding.60 However, accused students have, without
much success, challenged university decisions to withhold information
from them relevant to the charges against them on grounds that the
nondisclosure deprived them a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
In Gomes v. University of Maine System,61 the court considered
whether the accused students were entitled to a list of witnesses and a
summary of their testimony before the hearing. Following Nash, the court
concluded that where the witnesses testify in the presence of the accused
student, due process does not require advance disclosure of their identities
or a summary of their testimony.62 The court also considered the due
process implications of one-sided disclosure of evidence before the
hearing. The hearing officer provided a statement from a police report of
the incident to the complainant. Her attorney obtained a copy of the full
report from the police a few days later. On advice of university counsel,
the hearing officer did not provide the police report to the accused student
based on concern about the application of a Maine statute that prohibited
recipients of police reports from further distribution. The court noted that
the university’s one-sided disclosure of police report information raised a
question regarding the fairness of the hearing.63 However, considering the
chronology of events, the short time between the initiation of the discipline
process and the hearing, the court concluded that the non-disclosure of the
police report to the plaintiff did not deprive him of due process.64
60. See, e.g., Furey v. Temple Univ., 884 F. Supp. 2d 223, 250 (E.D. Pa. 2012)
(stating that university was not required to provide plaintiff with statements of adverse
witnesses before the hearing where the plaintiff had the names of the witnesses, and the
university had no statements from them); Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6,
18 (D. Me. 2005) (stating that no due process requirement exists to provide the accused
student with exculpatory or impeachment evidence).
61. Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 17 (D. Me. 2005).
62. Id. at 23 (citing Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F. 2d 655, 662–63 (11th Cir. 1987)).
The accused students attempted to distinguish Nash based on the relatively lower gravity
of the charge in that case (academic dishonesty) compared to their case (sexual assault).
Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 23. The court held that for purposes of ascertaining due process,
distinctions based on the nature of the charge is not appropriate. Id. at 24. The court noted,
however, the due process importance of a distinction between proceedings for failure to
meet academic standards and those for violation of conduct rules. Id. at 24 n.24. Citing
Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, the court noted that academic
dismissal cases call for “less stringent procedural requirements” than misconduct cases.
Id. (quoting Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 (1978)). The
court also noted that although the charges were different in Nash, the sanction (expulsion)
was identical to the sanction in the plaintiffs’ case. Id. at 24.
63. Id. at 20.
64. Id. at 22.
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In Furey v. Temple University,65 the court found no due process
violation in the university’s failure to provide the plaintiff in advance of
the hearing contact information for the student eyewitnesses that the
university expected to testify at the hearing. 66 The hearing administrator
contacted all student witnesses to request but not compel their presence at
the hearing. Two witnesses did not attend. The court noted that although
the university knew the students would not attend in advance, the plaintiff
did not, and could not address the issue of whether the hearing could
proceed fairly without them. Although the university’s failure to disclose
to the plaintiff before the hearing that eye-witnesses would not be present
viewed in isolation was not a due process deficiency, the court concluded
that the missing witness testimony “affected the fundamental reliability
and fairness in the [h]earing and appeal.”67
In Doe v. Ohio State University,68 a plaintiff expelled for sexual
misconduct argued that the university violated his right to due process by
failing to turn over to him information in its possession that he could have
used to challenge the complainant’s credibility.69 The court characterized
the plaintiff’s argument as denial of an opportunity for meaningful crossexamination.70 Citing Gomes, the court concluded that the plaintiff was
independently aware of most of the information he claimed the university
failed to provide and found him unlikely to succeed on that issue for
purposes of his request for a preliminary injunction.71
C. Confrontation Rights (Right to Cross-Examine Witnesses, Right to
Counsel)
In several recent cases, students have asserted denial of due process
because the university denied them the right to full or even limited
representation by an attorney in the course of the disciplinary process,
limited their rights to cross-examine witnesses, considered hearsay
testimony over their objection, or improperly permitted or denied
admission of certain types of evidence. Courts have been generally
unsympathetic to these challenges, noting that the rights of students facing
discipline are not the same as those afforded defendants in criminal

65. Furey v. Temple Univ., 884 F. Supp. 2d 223, 254 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 255. See discussion of the court’s decision in Furey infra at text
accompanying notes 157–166.
68. Doe v. Ohio State Univ., No. 2:15-CV-2830, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21064 (S.D.
Ohio Feb. 22, 2016).
69. Id. at *22.
70. Id. at *22–23.
71. Id. at *24–26 (citing Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 22 (D. Me.
2005)).
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proceedings.72 However, courts have recognized the importance of
providing the accused student with an opportunity to challenge the
credibility of witnesses, particularly in cases where witnesses testify
before hearing panel about critical and disputed facts.73
For example, in Marshall v. Indiana University,74 the student argued
that because the university had a staff member who was a licensed attorney
present the case against him and participate as a representative of the
university’s interests during the hearing panel’s deliberations, he was
entitled to representation by counsel.75 The court noted that although the
student’s argument was compelling, neither Seventh Circuit nor Indiana
law required that a university permit an accused student to be represented
by counsel.76 Similarly, in Furey v. Temple University,77 the court held
that applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing factors, any additional
safeguard against an erroneous outcome by allowing active representation
of counsel was outweighed by the “adversarial element and legal expertise
required on the part of the school to implement this procedure.”78
About a decade before the decisions in these cases, in Flaim v.
Medical College of Ohio,79 the Sixth Circuit considered a due process
objection on grounds that the plaintiff’s counsel was permitted to attend
the hearing, but not consult with the plaintiff or to speak during the
hearing.80 The medical school did not present its case through an attorney
and the hearing was not conducted under formal rules of evidence.81 The
court found in favor of the university. “Flaim’s complaint really boils
down to the assertion that he was denied the opportunity to present his case
as effectively as he would have wished—he could not reasonably claim
that he was denied the opportunity to present his case at all due to the lack
of legal counsel.”82

72. E.g., Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that a student
simultaneously subject to criminal charges for the misconduct is entitled to consult with
legal counsel during a disciplinary proceeding but is not entitled to active representation
by counsel in the proceeding); Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 103–04 (1st Cir.
1978) (same).
73. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes108–111.
74. Marshall v. Ind. Univ., No. 1:15-CV-00726-TWP-DKL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32999 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 15, 2016).
75. Id. at *5, 9, 13.
76. Id. at *13–14.
77. Furey v. Temple Univ., 884 F. Supp. 2d 223 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
78. Id. at 253.
79. Flaim v. Med. College of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005).
80.
Id. at 640.
81. Id.
82. Id. See also Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F. 2d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1988); Winnick v.
Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1972); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d
150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961).
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In Doe v. University of Cincinnati,83 the plaintiff argued that he was
denied an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses because under the
university’s rules the plaintiff was required to submit questions to the
panel chair in written form with no opportunity to ask follow up questions
or confront adverse witnesses directly.84 The court concluded that because
the Due Process Clause does not require any right to cross-examine
witnesses in a student discipline proceeding, the university’s process for
indirect questioning through the hearing chair was adequate.85
In Newsome v. Batavia Local School District,86 a case involving high
school student misconduct, the Sixth Circuit noted that although crossexamination is “the principal means by which the believability of a witness
and the truth of his testimony are tested”87 the value of cross examination
must be balanced against the burden allowing it would impose on school
administration.88 The plaintiff was disciplined for possession of marijuana
on school property.89 The court held that, in a high school discipline
proceeding, the benefit of requiring cross-examination rights as a tool to
reduce the risk of an erroneous outcome would be small because the school
administrator generally knows or can easily obtain through school records
information to help him evaluate the credibility of students’ accounts of
the alleged misconduct.90 In contrast, the burden on high school
administrators would be significant. Exposing student witnesses to crossexamination would likely deter students from coming forward with
information of serious misconduct.91 Also, requiring administrators to
oversee disciplinary proceedings with cross- examination rights would
require legal skills they do not have.92 After balancing the Mathews v.
Eldridge factors, the court concluded that due process did not require
cross-examination rights in high school student discipline cases.93
Courts have been sensitive to the administrative costs of permitting
cross-examination in university discipline cases. In Osteen v. Henley,94
the Seventh Circuit considered a due process challenge on grounds that the
hearing officer cut off a statement by the student’s advocate during the
83. Doe v. Univ. Cincinnati, No. 1:15-CV-681, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37924 (S.D.
Ohio, Mar. 23, 2016).
84. Id. at *34–35.
85. Id. at *35.
86. Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F. 2d 920 (6th Cir. 1988).
87. Id. at 924 (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)).
88. Id. at 925.
89. Id. at 921.
90. Id. at 925.
91. Id. (“[I]t is critically important that we protect the anonymity of students who
‘blow the whistle’ on their classmates . . . .”).
92. See Id. at 925–26.
93. Id. at 926.
94. Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221 (7th Cir. 1973).
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hearing.95 The court held that the Due Process Clause patrols the “outer
bounds” of administrators’ discretionary authority and the hearing officer
was within the bounds of that authority.96 The court held that the Due
Process Clause did not create a right to full representation by counsel for
a student in a university disciplinary proceeding.97 “We are reluctant to
encourage further bureaucratization [of education] by judicializing
university disciplinary proceedings, mindful also that one dimension of
academic freedom is the right of academic institutions to operate free of
heavy-handed governmental, including judicial, interference.”98
Recognizing that the relationship of universities to students is analogous
to that between merchant and customer, the court concluded the danger
was de minimus that rules prohibiting full attorney representation for
accused students will incite universities to an “orgy of expulsions.”99
On the other hand, courts appear to recognize that denial of any
opportunity to challenge the credibility of adverse witnesses may deprive
an accused university student of due process if the witness’s credibility is
in issue and the witness is testifying on facts critical to the case. In Flaim,
the Sixth Circuit noted that Flaim’s case did not require the fact-finder to
make a choice between believing an accuser or an accused based on their
different accounts of the events.100 The court noted that the Second Circuit
in Winnick v. Manning101 similarly held that the right to cross-examine
adverse witnesses is not essential to due process in school disciplinary

95. Id. at 225.
96. Id.
97. Id. See also Furey v. Temple Univ., 884 F. Supp. 2d 223, 249 (E.D. Pa. 2012)
(noting that university counsel was brought into the disciplinary proceeding because the
accused student was represented by counsel and that university counsel’s attendance at the
hearing “served to increase the legal and adversarial tone of the disciplinary process, and
contributed to the confrontational dynamic”); Flaim v. Med. College of Ohio, 418 F. 3d
629, 641 (6th Cir. 2005); Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 664 (11th Cir. 1987);
Winnick v. Manning, 460 F. 2d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1972) (citing Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of
Educ., 294 F. 2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961)); Holmes v. Poskanzer, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3216, at *16–17 (N.D. N.Y. 2007) (finding no deprivation of due process where students
were permitted to pose questions to adverse witnesses through the hearing panel).
98. Henley, 13 F.3d at 225–26 (citing Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 515, 759
F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985)).
99. Id. at 226 (noting that Northern Illinois University “can’t have been happy to lose
a student [to expulsion] whom it had wanted so much that it had given him a football
scholarship”). Johnson v. Temple Univ., No. 12-515, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134640 at
*27 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (recognizing a limited right to counsel when a student faces criminal
charges for the same conduct).
100. Flaim, 418 F.3d at 641 (stating that Flaim was given adequate opportunity to
address discrepancies in the adverse witness’s testimony during the hearing and that “[w]e
assume that any discrepancies, to the extent they might have existed, would not have been
sufficient to convince the Committee that Flaim had not been convicted of a felony”).
101. Winnick v. Manning, 460 F. 2d 545 (2d Cir. 1972).
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proceedings.102 However, in both Flaim and Winnick, the accused students
admitted the facts to which the adverse witnesses testified so that the
witnesses’ credibility on key issues of fact was not in dispute.103 In
Winnick, the Second Circuit noted in dicta that “if [the] case had resolved
itself into a problem of credibility, cross[-]examination of witnesses might
have been essential to a fair hearing.”104
In Furey v. Temple University,105 the court held that due process
required that the plaintiff be permitted to cross-examine witnesses, but not
necessarily by counsel. The court asserted that the purpose of crossexamination is to permit the accused to challenge the credibility and
truthfulness of witnesses, and particularly where facts are in dispute and
witness credibility is important, cross-examination of witnesses is “an
important safeguard.”106 The court concluded that the university provided
due process because it afforded the plaintiff the right to challenge
witnesses’ credibility by posing questions through the hearing panel
chair.107
In contrast, in Doe v. Regents of the University of California San
Diego,108 university conduct rules permitted the plaintiff to question the
complainant only by submitting questions in advance to the hearing officer
who had discretion to decide whether to pose them to the complainant.109
The court held that in a sexual assault case where witness credibility was
critical, the university denied the plaintiff due process when the hearing
officer asked the complainant nine of thirty-two questions the plaintiff
submitted for her.110 “While the Court understands the need to prevent
additional trauma to potential victims of sexual abuse . . . . [t]he limiting
of questions in this case curtailed the right of confrontation crucial to any
definition of a fair hearing.”111 The court also criticized the hearing
102. Flaim, 418 F. 3d at 641.
103. Id. at 641; Winnick, 460 F. 2d at 550.
104. Winnick, 460 F. 2d at 550.
105. Furey v. Temple University, 884 F. Supp. 2d 223 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
106. Furey, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 252. The court cites Winnick for the proposition that
due process does not require cross-examination where the witness does not testify to a fact
essential to the case against the accused, but may require it where the case turns on
credibility of fact witnesses. Id. at 251–52.
107. Id. at 252.
108. Minute Order, Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.-San Diego, No: 37-201500010549-CU-WM-CTL
(Sup.
Ct.
Cal.
July
10,
2015),
http://freepdfhosting.com/80f5b8c6c8.pdf. See generally Tovia Smith, For Students
Accused of Campus Rape, Legal Victories Win Back Rights, NPR (October 15, 2015),
http://www.npr.org/2015/10/15/446083439/for-students-accused-of-campus-rape-legalvictories-win-back-rights.
109. Minute Order at 2, Regents of the Univ. of Cal.-San Diego, No. 37-201500010549-CU-WM-CTL.
110. Id. at 2–4.
111. Id. at 2.
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panel’s reliance on facts stated in the report of the investigator, a staff
member in the university’s Office for the Prevention of Harassment and
Discrimination, who did not testify at the hearing and was not subject to
cross-examination.112 It noted that although due process does not require
the hearing panel to exclude hearsay testimony, it does require that the
accused student have an opportunity to challenge the investigator’s
findings and conclusions if they are presented as part of the evidence
against him.113 “[I]t was the panel’s responsibility to determine whether it
was more likely than not that petitioner violated the policy[,] and not defer
to an investigator who was not even present to testify at the hearing.”114
In Doe v. Rector and Visitors of George Mason University,115 the
court held that ex parte, off the record conversations with the complainant
conducted by the administrators in a sexual misconduct case created a
“glaring procedural deficienc[y].”116 The constitutional problem was not
that the conversations took place but that the administrators did not
provide the plaintiff with a report of them.117 The court held that the
plaintiff was entitled to a report of the evidence against him taken outside
his presence so that he could offer a meaningful defense.118 Balancing the
Mathews v. Eldridge factors, the court concluded that administrative
burden of making a record of the interviews and providing them to plaintiff
was low.119 The benefit in terms of reduced risk of an erroneous outcome
was high.120 Providing the content of the interviews to plaintiff was
essential to fulfill the due process requirement notice of the “full context
of the accusations and evidence against him” and an opportunity to
respond in his defense.121

112. The investigator’s report concluded “I find it more likely than not that . . .
[plaintiff] ignored [the complainant’s] objections to sexual activity in violation of the
Student Sex Offense Policy.” Id. at 3.
113. Id. at 3.
114. Id. (emphasis removed). See also, Doe v. Columbia, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS
13773 (2d Cir. July 29, 2016) (finding that a university is not shielded from liability for
sex discrimination by Title IX investigator who, although not the decision maker in a
student discipline case, is “endowed by the institution with supervisory authority or
institutional influence”over an otherwise non-biased decision maker. Id. at * 32.
115. Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Manson Univ., No. 1:15-cv-209, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24847 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2016).
116. Id. at *33.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961)
(The accused student should be “given. . . [sic] an oral or written report on the facts to
which each witness testifies.”).
119. Id. at *33–34.
120. See id. at *47.
121. Id. at *33–34.
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D. Impartiality of Tribunal
The university must provide an impartial tribunal to decide whether
an accused student is responsible, and if so, the appropriate sanction.
Members of the tribunal are entitled to a presumption of impartiality that
may be overcome only by a showing of actual bias.122 The plaintiff bears
the burden of overcoming the presumption of impartiality.123 Proof of
prejudice must be based on more than speculation and inference.124
Fifteen years ago, in Gomes v. University of Maine System,125 the
plaintiff who the university had expelled for sexual misconduct argued that
the hearing board chair was biased because she had participated in sexual
assault victim advocacy programs.126 The court found this evidence
insufficient to overcome the presumption of impartiality: “There is not
exactly a constituency in favor of sexual assault, and it is difficult to
imagine a proper member of the Hearing Committee not firmly against
it.”127
In the 2016 decision Doe v. University of Cincinnati,128 the court
considered and rejected an argument that a hearing board was not impartial
because: 1) the university provided board members with training on
sexual assault; and 2) the OCR had exerted pressure on the university to
expel students accused of student-on-student sexual misconduct.129 The
court observed: “Plaintiffs do not cite any authority for the repeated
implication . . . that a university must balance its sexual assault training
with training on the due process rights of the accused . . . .”130 Nor is it
reasonable to infer that the university “has a practice of railroading
students accused of sexual misconduct simply to appease the Department
of Education and preserve its federal funding.”131 In any event, these

122. See Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 1988); Nash v. Auburn
Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 665 (11th Cir. 1987); Duke v. N. Texas State Univ. 469 F. 2d 829,
834 (5th Cir. 1972); Furey v. Temple Univ., 884 F. Supp. 2d 223, 255 (E.D. Pa. 2012). See
also Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 1:15-CV-681, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37924, at *29
(S.D. Ohio, Mar. 23, 2016); Doe v. Ohio State Univ., No. 2:15-cv-2830, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21064, at *30 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 22, 2016). 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note
21, at 12; Questions and Answers, supra note 29, at 32.
123. Gorman, 837 F.2d at 15.
124. Furey, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 255 (citing Gorman, 837 F.2d at 15); Duke, 469 F. 2d
at 834. See also Ohio State Univ., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21064, at *30.
125. Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D. Me. 2005).
126. Id. at 29.
127. Id. at 31.
128. Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. No. 1:15-CV-681, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37924
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 2016).
129. Id. at*14–15, 28.
130. Id. at *30.
131. Id. at *31.
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assertions of bias were insufficient to overcome the presumption of
impartiality.132
Similarly in In Doe v. Ohio State University,133 the plaintiff sought a
preliminary injunction against the University to stay his expulsion at the
conclusion of a disciplinary proceeding against him for sexual misconduct.
The student alleged that training materials provided to members of the
hearing panel biased the panel members against males accused of sexual
misconduct.134 In the course of discovery in federal court, the plaintiff
learned that the training materials provided to members of his hearing
panel stated that “a [v]ictim centered approach can lead to safer campus
communities;” “[s]ex offenders are overwhelmingly white males;” “[i]n a
large study of college men, 8.8% admitted rape or attempted rape;” “[s]ex
offenders are experts in rationalizing their behavior;” and “22-57% of
college men report perpetrating a form of sexually aggressive behavior.”135
The magistrate judge concluded that there was “undeniably some
evidence. . .from which it could be inferred that the training
materials. . .[were] biased against males who are accused of sexual
misconduct.”136 However, the judge concluded that because the training
materials were the only evidence of hearing panel bias that the plaintiff
presented, he was not likely to prevail on the merits of his due process
challenge.137
The OCR has clearly made training for persons involved in the
investigation and adjudication of student sexual misconduct complaints a
centerpiece of its guidance and a focus of Title IX enforcement activity
against universities.138 The 2011 Letter requires that all persons involved
132. Id.
133. Doe v. Ohio State Univ., No. 2:15-cv-2830, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21064 (S.D.
Ohio Feb. 22, 2016).
134. Id. at *31.
135. Id. at * 8–9 (alteration in original).
136. Id. at * 30–31.
137. Id. at * 32. See also Marshall v. Ind. Univ., No. 1:15-cv-00726-TWP-DKL, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32999, at *12–14 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 15, 2016). The plaintiff argued that
the hearing panel was biased because at the time of the hearing Indiana-University
Bloomington was under OCR investigation for Title IX non-compliance for its handling of
complaints of sexual assault with considerable media attention, putting pressure on the
university to prosecute all sexual misconduct complaints aggressively. The court held that
under Seventh Circuit precedent, the plaintiff received all the process he was due. The
university would have been justified in providing even less process than he received,
particularly because the allegations against him included on-campus criminal activity. Id.
at *12–14 (citing Medlock v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 738 F.3d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 2013)) (stating
that expulsion prior to any hearing complied with due process where student was accused
of possession of a six foot tall marijuana plant in his college dorm room and other criminal
activity with no facts in dispute).
138. For example, as part of an agreement with OCR resolving an investigation
(“proactive compliance review”) for violation of Title IX, Ohio State University agreed to
retain a Title IX Coordinator who would oversee training of any persons who have a role
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in implementing the grievance procedure, including members of a hearing
panel, must be trained to “handl[e] complaints of sexual harassment and
sexual violence.”139 The Letter specifies that the training should include:
[I]nformation on working with and interviewing persons subjected to
sexual violence; information on particular types of conduct that would
constitute sexual violence. . . ; the proper standard of review [sic,
standard of proof?] for sexual violence complaints (preponderance of
the evidence); information on consent and the role drugs or alcohol can
play in the ability to consent; the importance of accountability for
individuals found to have committed sexual violence; the need for
remedial actions for the perpetrator, complainant, and school
community; how to determine credibility; how to evaluate evidence
and weigh it in an impartial manner; how to conduct investigations;
confidentiality; the effects of trauma, including neurobiological
change; and cultural awareness training regarding how sexual violence
may impact students differently depending on their cultural
backgrounds.140

Given the OCR’s insistence that all university faculty, staff and
student investigators, and adjudicators of student sexual misconduct cases
receive subject specific training, it is no surprise that since 2011, an
industry has emerged to provide it.141
Apart from the possible effect of the training on the impartiality of
hearing board members, the mandated informational content may call into
question the accused student’s opportunity to be heard and offer a
in investigating or adjudicating student conduct issues involving sex discrimination under
Title IX. Resolution Agreement: Ohio State University OCR Docket # 15-10-6002, at 9
(2014), http://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/ohio-state-agreement.pdf.
The
university agreed that the OCR will review and approve the training materials. Id.
139. 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 21 at 12; Questions and Answers, supra
note 29, at 25.
140. Questions and Answers, supra note 29, at 40. Training the university must
provide to all employees likely to witness or receive reports of sexual violence “should
include practical information about how to prevent and identify sexual violence . . . ; the
behaviors that may lead to and result in sexual violence; the attitudes of bystanders that
may allow conduct to continue; the potential for revictimization by responders and its effect
on students; appropriate methods for responding to a student who may have experienced
sexual violence, including the use of nonjudgmental language; the impact of trauma on
victims; . . .” Id. at 38.
141. See About ATIXA and Title IX, ASS’N OF TITLE IX ADM’RS (ATIXA),
https://atixa.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2016) (“OCR may not have realized that with
its April 4th, 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, it has created it [sic] [a] new profession and a
new field.”). See generally Anemona Hartocollis, Colleges Spending Millions to Deal With
Sexual
Misconduct
Complaints,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
29,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/us/colleges-beef-up-bureaucracies-to-deal-withsexual-misconduct.html?_r=0 (stating that Brett Sokolow, Executive Director of ATIXA,
described university investment in compliance with the April 2011 letter as a “cottage
industry”).
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meaningful defense. Although some topics provide panel members with
otherwise publicly available information about the university’s student
conduct rules and hearing process, many topics require presentation of
information that is fairly the subject of scientific disagreement, or
specifically designed to affect hearing panel members’ interpretation of
the evidence presented unfavorably to theaccused student. For example,
OCR explains that required training about the neurobiological “effects of
trauma” should inform trainees that the human brain responds to trauma
by releasing chemicals into the nervous system which affect the person’s
perception at the time of the trauma and may corrupt the person’s recall of
the event, and may explain inconsistencies or gaps in complainants’
reports of events.142 Because the chemical response to trauma negatively
affects memory function, investigators and adjudicators should “anticipate
non-linear accounts, with jumping around and fragmented memories.”
Moreover, an investigator should refrain from pressing complainants for
facts about the event that is the subject of the complaint because doing so
may cause “additional stress.”143
Unlike expert testimony presented during the course of a hearing, the
mandatory training of investigators and panel members occurs outside the
hearing process. A student accused of sexual misconduct has no
opportunity to know of the scope or content of this information. Arguably,
without this information, he lacks a meaningful opportunity to challenge
its accuracy or its relevance to the fair and unbiased resolution of the facts
in dispute in the case against him.
Training which the university provides to investigators and members
of student conduct tribunals could be considered a form of ex parte
contact. Ex parte communications raise due process concerns when they
call into question the appearance of impartiality of a proceeding.144
However, the standard is high for establishing a connection between ex
parte communications and the impartiality of the tribunal. The plaintiff
must show that the communications “irrevocably taint[]” the integrity of
the process and the fairness of the result.”145 Although the plaintiffs in
142. MICHAEL HENRY ET AL., ATIXA, THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS OF TITLE IX
INVESTIGATIONS 3 (2016), https://atixa.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/7Deadly-Sins_Short_with-Teaser_Reduced-Size.pdf.
143. Id. at 4. “Asking individuals what happened may be less effective than asking
them how it made them feel, as the feelings may help to decode memories of what caused
the emotions.” Id.
144. Gomes v. Univ. of Maine Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 35 (D. Me. 2005) (quoting
Grieco v. Meachum, 533 F.2d 713, 719 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 858 (1976),
overruled on other grounds by Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985)).
145. Id. (quoting Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 767 F. Supp.
333, 349 (D. Me. 1991)). See, e.g., Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 37 (“The Appeal Committee
was perfectly capable of drawing its own inferences from the record before it, and there is
no evidence it was unduly influenced by [the ex parte communication.”).
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Doe v. University of Cincinnati, and Doe v. Ohio State did not prevail, the
courts’ reaction to the complainant-centered content of the training the
hearing members received reveals a dangerous thicket for universities who
must simultaneously comply with OCR’s content-specific training
requirements and fulfill their obligation to provide an unbiased hearing
process.
In Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason University,146 the
plaintiff successfully asserted a denial of due process based on the bias of
the decision-maker in his discipline case.147 The administrator hearing the
complainant’s appeal of a finding of no misconduct conceded that when
he met with the plaintiff he had already decided to reverse the finding of
the hearing board and find the plaintiff responsible for sexual assault.148
The administrator “never truly afforded plaintiff a meaningful opportunity
to be heard in the appeal process.”149 The court recognized Fourth Circuit
precedent holding that an administrator can be an impartial decision maker
even though he has made a conditional decision about a case pending
further developments.150 But the administrator hearing the plaintiff’s
appeal admitted that he had made up his mind conclusively as to the
plaintiff’s responsibility for sexual assault without first hearing the
plaintiff’s defense.151 The court stopped short of finding that the
administrator was biased, but it held that because of the administrator’s
prejudgment, the plaintiff’s opportunity to be heard was not meaningful.152
E. Right to Appeal; Right to Record of Hearing
The opportunity to be heard includes the ability to present a
meaningful defense. Courts have generally responded to challenges to the
adequacy of appeals procedures under due process grounds by noting that
an accused student has no constitutional right to appeal if the university
has provided a hearing that provides due process.153 In Boyd v. State
146. Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., No. 1:15-cv-209, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24847 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2016).
147. Id. at *46.
148. Id. at *14–16.
149. Id. at *34.
150. Id. at *35.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *36–37. The Dean of Students heard the plaintiff’s appeal following the
administrator’s decision to expel him. See id. at *37–38. The court held that the procedure
afforded the plaintiff in this subsequent appeal did not overcome the earlier lack of due
process. See id. at *38. The Dean of Students also met with the accusing student ex parte
and off the record and again provided the plaintiff no opportunity to respond or defend
himself. Id.
153. E.g., Gomes v. Univ. of Maine Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 33 (D. Me. 2005);
Winnick v. Manning, 460 F. 2d, 545, 549 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972). In Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati,
No. 1:15-CV-681, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37924, at *27–28 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 2016),
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University of New York at Cortland,154 the New York Supreme Court
found that the university’s failure to provide the plaintiff with a detailed
statement of the hearing panel’s factual findings deprived the plaintiff of
due process.155 “[S]uch a statement is necessary to permit the student to
effectively challenge the determination in administrative appeals and in
the courts and to ensure that the decision was based on evidence in the
record.”156 Although the case does not explain at what stage of a
disciplinary process detailed findings of fact must be produced and
provided to the accused student, under New York law, public institutions
must justify disciplinary decisions with findings of fact sufficient to
support the charges.
F. Accumulation of Procedural Problems
In Furey v. Temple University,157 the plaintiff was charged with
assaulting an off-duty police officer and was expelled.158 The student
raised several aspects of the disciplinary process as due process
violations.159 The trial court, after a bench trial, concluded that, although
the procedural issues that the plaintiff raised, taken individually, did not
necessarily deprive the plaintiff of due process, “the accumulation of
mistakes at each step of the process and failures to comply with the Temple
Code resulted in a violation of procedural due process.”160
The plaintiff alleged that he was denied due process because he was
not permitted to cross-examine adverse witnesses directly.161 Under the

the court held that any due process deficiencies in the initial hearings on the charges against
the plaintiffs were cured on appeal. The plaintiffs’ appeals were sustained and they were
granted new hearings at which the alleged procedural defects were not repeated. Id.
154. Boyd v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Cortland, 973 N.Y.S.2d 413 (N.Y. App. Div.
2013).
155. Id. at 415. The university charged the student with violation of its rules, which
define as misconduct failure to comply with state laws. Id. at 414. The university charged
the student with violation of Delaware law based on alleged harassment of a University of
Delaware student which resulted in a Delaware warrant for his arrest. Id. The court held
that the statement of the hearing panel that the student “harassed and threatened [the
victim]” failed to set forth the specific conduct that supported the charges that he violated
Delaware law. Id. at 415.
156. Id. at 415 (quoting Matter of Kalinsky v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 557
N.Y.S.2d 557, 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)). See also Matter of Lambraia v. State Univ. of
N.Y. at Binghamton, 23 N.Y.S.3d 679, 681 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (finding that the
“Conduct Board sufficiently detailed its factual findings”); Matter of Budd v. State Univ.
of N.Y. at Geneseo, 19 N.Y.S.3d 825, 827 (2015) (finding that the university’s written
determination sufficiently “set forth detailed factual findings”).
157. Furey v. Temple Univ., 884 F. Supp. 2d 223 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
158. Id. at 227, 230.
159. Id. at 248.
160. Id. at 259.
161. Id. at 251–52.
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university’s conduct process rules, the plaintiff was permitted to submit
questions for adverse witnesses through the hearing panel chair.162 The
court held that the university’s process for indirect cross-examination
provided due process, but that the manner in which the witnesses were
questioned raised fairness issues that, considered together with other
aspects of the hearing, deprived the plaintiff of his right to due process.163
“[W]hen a hearing on serious charges turns on issues of credibility, as this
Hearing did, the importance of a fair tribunal, where the testimony of all
of the witnesses is examined for truthfulness, is heightened.”164
The court identified as the most serious issues that the administrator
hearing the plaintiff’s appeal failed to give presumptive weight to the
initial hearing board’s recommendation, his deference to the police
officer’s version of the events, ex parte conversations with a witness who
did not appear to testify at the hearing, and the absence of eye witness
testimony at the hearing other than the police officer.165 The court also
noted as due process issues the tone of the hearing itself (which the court
described as “hostile),” and the deferential questioning of the police officer
relative to the questioning of the plaintiff.166
III. CONCLUSIONS
The trial court’s decision in Furey, could be read as creating a new
“omnibus” standard for due process. Courts have considered university
discipline due process as a sum of the individual parts of the process
provided. A university provides due process if no one part of the discipline
process falls below the minimum standard of due process. The trial court
in Furey may have broken new ground by holding that a university fails to
provide due process through an accumulation of procedural mistakes, none
of which taken individually deprived the plaintiff of due process. The
prospect of a challenge to the “overall fairness” of a disciplinary process
on grounds that as a whole it deviated in several relatively minor respects
from ideal process raises the likelihood of success on appeal and the
likelihood that students will continue the disciplinary process in federal
court after it concludes on campus.
The new role of universities in investigating and adjudicating
complaints of student-on-student sexual misconduct under the guidelines
set forth in the 2011 Letter puts universities in a difficult position as they
try to fulfill both their obligation under Title IX and their obligation to

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 229
Id. at 252.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 259–60.
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provide due process of law to accused students. The OCR may intend that
the mandatory training for all persons involved in the handling of sexual
misconduct cases will correct misconceptions and irrational biases against
victims of sexual misconduct. However, to the extent that the training is
designed to influence investigators and adjudicators outside the hearing
process regarding critical issues (e.g., the credibility of witnesses on the
issue of consent) within the hearing process, it calls into question the
accused student’s opportunity to be heard and present a meaningful
defense. Moreover, a female “victim-centered” response to a claim of
sexual misconduct against a male student may amount to anti-male bias
and may violate the accused student’s rights under Title IX. In Doe v.
Columbia University,167 a male student who had been suspended for an act
of sexual coercion against a female student claimed that the university
Title IX investigator responsible for his case was affected by anti-male
bias and that the investigator and other university decision makers were
motivated to discipline him to protect the university from public criticism
from female students and the public regarding its prior responses to female
students’ claims of sexual assault. 168 The Second Circuit held that the
plaintiff pled facts that raised a “plausible minimal inference of bias”
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.169
To respond to the new Title IX requirements, universities must add
staff, provide OCR-approved training and in many cases fundamentally
redesign their discipline procedures to fulfill their role as investigator and
adjudicator of their students’ sexual conduct. The new capacity of
universities to administer an elaborate investigative and adjudicative
procedure to comply with Title IX may change judicial perception of the
administrative burden associated with additional due process protection
for accused students. If courts perceive universities as protectors of the
rights of sexual misconduct complainants and adversaries of accused
students, judicial perception of the Mathews v. Eldridge factors may tip in
favor of requiring universities to provide litigation-style due process
protections for accused students.
In 2015, two bills were introduced in Congress that would require
universities to provide specific procedural rights to students accused of
sexual misconduct including notice of the charges two weeks before the

167. Doe v. Columbia Univ., Nos. 15-1536, 15-1661, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13773
(2d Cir. July 29, 2016).
168. Id. at *4. “Against this factual background, it is entirely plausible that the
University’s decision-makers and its investigator were motivated to favor the accusing
female over the accused male, so as to protect themselves and the University from
accusations that they had failed to protect female students from sexual assault.” Id. at
* 25.
169. Id. at *2.
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hearing, the right to all inculpatory and exculpatory evidence before the
hearing, the right to confront witnesses by direct questioning, and
representation by an attorney at all stages of the process, including the
investigation.170 Notably, both bills include a definition of sexual violence
that does not include “sexual coercion,”171 which would likely reduce the
volume of sexual misconduct cases for universities.172
Procedural safeguards such as a right to discovery, active
representation by counsel, and attorney examination of witnesses will
impose significant costs on universities. The Seventh Circuit in Osteen
warned that the involvement of attorneys in a discipline proceeding would
judicialize the process, and undesirably shift the tone of discipline cases
from educational to adversarial. Beyond tone, the involvement of
attorneys for both sides will no doubt expand the duration of the process,
potentially outliving the time to degree for the students involved.
The effectiveness of university discipline process as a tool to ensure
safety on campus and to inculcate norms of ethical and civil behavior
among students depends on how students perceive it. Because students’
time at their university is relatively short, a university must provide swift
process to ensure that students can see justice served among their cohort
while they are still students. If the addition of litigation-style procedural
safeguards means that universities cannot resolve discipline cases swiftly,
the value of the process to the community is substantially diminished.
Instead of reinforcing community ethical and civil values, protracted
student discipline processes may erode them.
The stakes for both universities and students in the discipline
proceedings are indeed high. This survey of recent cases reveals the legal
challenges for universities who must anticipate what due process requires
and ensure in practice that each student accused of misconduct receives a
fair hearing. It also reveals the challenge for courts as they apply due
process precedents to new student discipline processes designed to ensure
university compliance with the OCR’s interpretation of Title IX. What
process is due has always reflected a balance between public and private
interests. A new challenge for courts is to strike the balance between the
constitutional requirement of due process of law and the
antidiscrimination mandate of Title IX.

170. Fair Campus Act of 2015, H.R. 3408, 114th Cong. (2015); Safe Campus Act of
2015, H.R. 3403, 114th Cong. (2015). Two states have enacted legislation that require
colleges or universities in the state higher education system to provide a student accused
of certain misconduct a right to be represented by an attorney. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11640.11 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 15-10-56 (2015).
171. See supra note 29.
172. Id.

